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SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

A Critical Review of the Law of
Business Loss Claims in Georgia
Eminent Domain Jurisprudence

by Charles M. Cork, III*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Georgia Constitution provides that "private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public purposes without just and adequate
compensation being first paid."' While the courts have recognized that
a business is property within the meaning of the constitution, case law
would rewrite this provision more or less as follows:
*

Partner in the firm of Reynolds & McArthur, Macon, Georgia. Mercer University

(B.A., summa cum laude, 1978; J.D., cum laude, 1982). Author, Eminent Domain chapter
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Association. Editor, Macon Bar Association Newsletter (1988-present). Editor, Recent Legal
Developments Survey, Macon Bar Association Newsletter (1986-present).
The Author wishes to thank his research assistant, Wendy L. Sullivan, for her help in
preparing this Article.
1. GA. CONST. art. I, § 3, para. 1(a).
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Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public purposes
without just and adequate compensation being first paid, except that
the business of a property owner may be partially taken or damaged
without compensation, and except that the business of a property
owner or tenant may be temporarily taken or damaged without
compensation.
Contradictory rules have also evolved for the means of valuing both the
business damage that occurs and the loss in value of the underlying real
property interests. Outcomes have turned on distinctions between
"landowner" and "tenant," "permanent" and "temporary," "total" and
"partial," "business" and "real property," and "unique" and "nonunique,"
most of which have no apparent connection with the constitutional text.
This Article surveys the background of business damage claims in
Georgia eminent domain and inverse condemnation law. It then
critically reviews certain problem areas to show how contradictory and
counter-intuitive rulings developed and calls for the resolution of those
issues by overruling certain cases. The Article concludes with a proposal
for a comprehensive approach to valuation questions in Georgia,
including business valuation questions.
II.

HISTORICAL SURVEY

A. The Emergence of the Duty to Compensate for Loss of Business in
Eminent Domain Cases
Business damages became compensable as a separate item of
compensation in 1966 when the supreme court decided Bowers v. Fulton
County. Before 1966 an owner could use business damage evidence to
prove the value of the property before and after the taking, but an owner
could not recover business damages as a separate item.3 In the leading
case, Pause v. City of Atlanta,' in which a tenant claimed damages
resulting from the construction of a bridge that impeded access to the
premises, the Georgia Supreme Court held that
neither the profits of the business carried on upon the premises so
leased, nor the cost of fixtures or other improvements placed therein,
nor of articles purchased for the purpose of enabling the lessee to
conduct such business, nor the diminution in value of such fixtures,
improvements, or articles as are removed by the lessee from the
premises upon leaving the same are recoverable as damages; but the

2. 221 Ga. 731, 146 S.E.2d 884 (1966).
3. Id. at 736, 146 S.E.2d at 889.
4.

98 Ga. 92, 26 S.E. 489 (1896).

1999]

EMINENT DOMAIN

13

increased value of the premises for rent in consequence of the putting
in of such fixtures and improvements may be considered in computing
the damages to the leasehold estate.
... [Ilt is competent for the plaintiff to prove that the business in
question was in fact profitable, not for the purpose of recovering any
loss in profits, but solely to illustrate and throw light upon the value
of the premises for rent.5
While the above rules constituted the predominant view before 1966,6
there were other cases suggesting other measures of damages. Some
cases referred to "special damages " ' or "direct damages,"' thereby

5. Id. at 92-93, 26 S.E. at 489.
6. See, e.g., Streyer v. Georgia S. & Fla. R.R., 90 Ga. 56, 56, 15 S.E. 637, 637 (1892)
(explaining that the only measure is diminished market value, not market value for a
particular purpose and not diminished rental value, though both have a bearing on general
market value); Howard v. Bibb County, 127 Ga. 291,293,56 S.E. 418,418-19 (1907) (same,
suggesting that damage to dairy cows is not damage to property); Nelson v. City of Atlanta,
138 Ga. 252, 254, 75 S.E. 245, 246 (1912) (same); City of Atlanta v. Atlas Realty Co., 17 Ga.
App. 426, 426, 87 S.E. 698, 699 (1916) (explaining that the measure is diminished market
value, not diminished rental value or lost rentals).
7. See, e.g., Selma, Rome & Dalton R.R. v. Redwine, 51 Ga. 470, 475 (1874) (allowing
special damage to an orchard to be shown); Kavanagh v. Mobile & Girard R.R., 78 Ga. 271,
272-73 (1886) (holding that plaintiff may recover special damages because of noise and
smoke of railroad, as in cases of other public nuisances that cause special damages);
Campbell v. Metropolitan St. R.R., 82 Ga, 320, 320, 9 S.E. 1078, 1079 (1889) (explaining
that plaintiff may recover special damages because of operation of railroad in street);
Harvey v. Georgia S. & Fla. R.R., 90 Ga. 66, 66, 15 S.E. 783, 783-84 (1892) (holding that
business incurs special damages if alley customers are prevented from using same access
as before construction and that the loss of business may not be offset by consequential
benefits resulting from the construction); Brunswick & W. R.R. v. Hardey & Co., 112 Ga.
604, 607-08,37 S.E. 888,889-90 (1901) (holding that business owner could recover business
damages for blockage of access to business and was not limited to loss in value to the
realty); Savannah Fla. & W. R.R. v. Gill, 118 Ga. 737, 743-44, 45 S.E. 623, 625-26 (1903)
(holding that public nuisance causing special damage gives right of action for damages or
abatement). Although these cases involved regulated enterprises rather than governmental
entities, the private enterprise was acting under a delegated power of eminent domain.
In these cases the supreme court did not distinguish between liability under the
constitution or under the common law of nuisance; rather, it treated the nuisance as an
exercise of power pursuant to legislative authority that was subject to constitutional
limitations on the power of eminent domain. See, e.g., Campbell, 82 Ga. at 324-25, 9 S.E.
at 1079.
8. See, e.g., City of Atlanta v. Green, 67 Ga. 386 (1881). This was the first case to allow
recovery of consequential damages when property was damaged but not taken under the
1877 constitutional amendment that extended liability when property was taken "or
damaged." In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court rejected the proposition that
damage under the constitution referred only to direct damages such as a "temporary
spoliation or invasion." Id. at 388-89. It suggests, therefore, that one can recover direct
and temporary losses that are not measured by the value of the land.
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suggesting that some compensation could be allowed for injury to
economically viable activities on the property apart from the general
damage of lost fair market value.9 Tenants, as owners of the use of
property, could recover for any injury to the use. 10 A tenancy at will
was held to have no market value because it was unassignable, and thus
its value would have to be determined by an impartial jury in view of all
proven facts, including the extent of its profitability."
Finally, a view emerged that realty could have a peculiar value to the
owner in excess of its fair market value, and in such cases, the owner is
entitled to recover the higher value. Initially, this notion came from
cases involving types of property that are so peculiar as to lack a market
value or that have such a special design that the general market would
not compensate for the loss.12 In the decade before Bowers, this view
evolved through a series of court of appeals decisions into the general
proposition that the owner of property would be entitled to recover the
actual, peculiar, or unique value of the property when the evidence
showed that fair market value would not justly and adequately
compensate the owner. 13 Thus, these cases recognized that whether

9. See, e.g., Dougherty County v. Tift, 75 Ga. 815,815 (1885) (when county condemned
the site of a toll bridge to build a free bridge, condemnee could show evidence of the cost
of building the toll bridge and the income derived from it in establishing compensation);
Davis v. East Tenn. Va. & Ga. Ry., 87 Ga. 605, 611-12, 13 S.E. 567, 569 (1891) (explaining
that in a case sounding only in nuisance, special damages could be awarded for lost rentals
and profits, and these damages could not be offset by consequential benefits); Central Ga.
Power Co. v. Stubbs, 141 Ga. 172, 183, 80 S.E. 636, 641 (1913) (claim for business losses
would have been sustained if the nuisance had affected the ability of customers to go to the
store).
10. Bentley v. City of Atlanta, 92 Ga. 623, 627, 18 S.E. 1013, 1014 (1893). Even Pause
makes this point, 98 Ga. at 96-97, 26 S.E. at 490 (quoting Bentley, 92 Ga. at 627, 18 S.E.
at 1014), without reconciling it with the headnotes quoted above. See supra text
accompanying note 5.
11. Hayes v. City of Atlanta, 1 Ga. App. 25, 30-31, 57 S.E. 1087, 1089 (1907).
12. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 120 Ga. 268,281,48 S.E.
15, 20 (1904) (holding that, when property, such as a bridge or railroad, is used in a
peculiar manner, it may be valued for the particular use rather than for general uses); see
also Elbert County v. Brown, 16 Ga. App. 834, 847, 86 S.E. 651, 656 (1915) (holding that
the value to the owner was awardable for damage to property that was designed for a
special use); Housing Auth. of Augusta v. Holloway, 63 Ga. App. 485, 486-87, 11 S.E.2d
418, 419 (1940) (same).
13. See, e.g., Housing Auth. of Savannah v. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, Inc., 91 Ga.
App. 881, 884-86, 87 S.E.2d 671, 675-76 (1955) (explaining that actual pecuniary value is
awardable when actual value and market value are not the same); Georgia Power Co. v.
Pittman, 92 Ga. App. 673, 675,89 S.E.2d 577,579 (1955) (explaining that actual pecuniary
value is to be awarded if market value is difficult to determine); Polk v. Fulton County, 96
Ga. App. 733, 736, 101 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1957) (holding that fair and reasonable value of
property is to be awarded if fair market vaiue does not coincide with actual value); Fulton
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fair market value constituted just and adequate compensation was to be
determined by the circumstances of the case rather than by dogma or
ideology.14 No specific measure of damages was assigned for such
cases, but because the owner could show the profitability of the realty
and because the jury could award the actual value of the realty, the
cases strongly suggested that realty could be valued in terms of its
economic use.
In 1966 the court in Bowers pronounced the statements in the earlier
cases against the recoverability of business damages to be
obiter dictum because they either did not involve the taking or directly
damaging of the condemnee's physical property by the condemnor, but
were suits in which damages were claimed because improvements
made by the condemnor rendered less valuable the condemnee's
premises or in which no claim for damages was made on account of
damage to the condemnee's business or for expenses incurred by
him.15

The court rejected the earlier cases as suggesting that the meaning of
property in the constitution was limited to physical objects.16 Instead,
the court held that property signifies "every species of property, real and
personal, corporeal and incorporeal" 7 and embraces not only the thing
itself but also "the right of a person to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose
of it, and the corresponding right to exclude others from the use." 8

County v. Cox, 99 Ga. App. 743, 748, 109 S.E.2d 849, 853 (1959) (explaining that value
above fair market value is awardable only if the property has special and unique value to
the owner alone); Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Troncalli, 111 Ga. App. 515, 518, 142 S.E.2d
93, 95 (1965) (holding that the owner is entitled to pecuniary value for loss of business
located in a place that could not be duplicated in other locations near its customer base).
14. A pattern jury instruction arose from this line of cases as follows: "While fair
market value is ordinarily the same as actual value, there may be circumstances in which
it may not be the same, and under those circumstances your measure of damage would be
actual value. It is up to you to determine whether such circumstances exist." COUNCIL OF
SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES OF GEORGIA, SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-VOLUME
I: CwIL CASES 55 (3d ed. 1991).

15. 221 Ga. at 736-37, 146 S.E.2d at 889. An earlier case also had reached the same
conclusion about Pause. See Brunswick & W. R.R. v. Hardey & Co., 112 Ga. 604, 608-09,
37 S.E. 888, 889-90 (1901).
16. Bowers, 221 Ga. at 737, 146 S.E.2d at 889.
17.

Id.

18. Id., 146 S.E.2d at 890 (internal quotation marks omitted). Bowers thus provides
two ways to understand the nature of business. Depending on one's metaphysical
proclivities, business can be understood as an incorporeal entity, connected with the real
property as a soul is attached to a body. Using Ockham's razor, the rest of us may
understand business as a particular way one uses corporeal property. In the first case,
business is primarily a noun; in the latter, it is a verb.
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Under this standard, a business is property that is protected by the
eminent domain clause of the constitution.' 9
The court in Bowers found no conflict between its holding that
business damages are a separate item of recovery and the prior rule that
the suitability of real property for peculiar purposes, as manifested by
its income-producing potential, could show a value in excess of fair
market value.2 ° The court reasoned that "[t]he destruction of an
established business is and must be a separate item of recovery" because
business loss does not reflect mere loss in market value; indeed, the
value of a business may often exceed the value of the real estate on
which it is located.2" Using the example of a $100,000 business
operating in a "shabby and cheap building" worth $5000, the court
considered it "absurd" and "fallacious" to appraise the realty as having
the value of the business.22
In a case decided the same year as Bowers, the supreme court
provided the following observation that may serve to explain its
conceptual orientation in Bowers:
Private property is the antithesis of Socialism or Communism. Indeed,
it is an insuperable barrier to the establishment of either collective
system of government. Too often, as in this case, the desire of the
average citizen to secure the blessings of a good thing like beautification of our highways, and their safety, blinds them to a consideration
of the property owner's right to be saved from harm by even the
government. The thoughtless, the irresponsible, and the misguided
will likely say that this court has blocked the effort to beautify and
render our highways safer. But the actual truth is that we have only
protected constitutional rights by condemning the unconstitutional
method to attain such desirable ends, and to emphasize that there is
a perfect constitutional way which must be employed for that purpose.
Those whose ox is not being gored by this Act might be impatient and
complain of this decision, but if this court yielded to them and
sanctioned this violation of the Constitution we would thereby set a
precedent whereby tomorrow when the critics are having their own ox
gored, we would be bound to refuse them any protection. Our decisions
are not just good for today but they are equally valid tomorrow. 3

19. Id. at 738-39, 146 S.E.2d at 890-91.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 739, 146 S.E.2d at 891.

22. Id.
23. State Highway Dep't v. Branch, 222 Ga. 770, 772, 152 S.E.2d 372, 374 (1966).
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In other decisions from the same period, the court also noted the
importance of property as a barrier to totalitarianism2 4 and that the
duty to pay just compensation was a protection of individuals from the
oppressive and tyrannical power of the state.25
B. The Emergence of an Element of Uniqueness Before Business
Losses May Be Recovered
Taken to its logical extreme, Bowers would have authorized recovery
for the taking or damaging of every business on every condemned lot,
even if the business could be resumed on neighboring property with
minimal interruption or customer attrition. Moreover, by finding no
conflict between Bowers and the peculiar value cases, the court arguably
authorized recovery of business damages and a value of the realty based
on its income-related peculiar value, thus posing a substantial risk of
double recovery for the same loss. Subsequent cases addressed the
former problem by invoking a uniqueness requirement for recovery of
business damages. The latter problem did not materialize because,
apparently, owners chose, or trial courts persuaded them, not to assert
claims that would run the risk of double recovery.
The first pertinent case after Bowers rejected a farmer's claim that the
income stream from the sale of his farm's products and his pond's fish
justified finding that the farm had a peculiar value above fair market
value. 28 Another similar case involved a claim for lost rental income
because the taking of a large strip of land for a road in the middle of a
farm persuaded the tenant to cease farming operations. In rejecting
this claim, the court distinguished Bowers on the ground that the
evidence failed to show that the value of the property to the landlord
was greater than the inherent value of the land for farming.28
The earliest case that explicitly mentioned a uniqueness requirement
did so only in conjunction with a distinction between a total and a
partial destruction of a business. Unlike Bowers, which involved the
total destruction of a business and mentioned no explicit requirement of

24. See Bailey v. Housing Auth. of Bainbridge, 214 Ga. 790,791-92, 107 S.E.2d 812,813
(1959), quoted in McCord v. Housing Auth. of Atlanta, 246 Ga. 547, 550, 272 S.E.2d 247,
250 (1980).
25. See Whipple v. County of Houston, 214 Ga. 532,538-39, 105 S.E.2d 898, 903 (1958);
see also Williams v. City of LaGrange, 213 Ga. 241, 243, 98 S.E.2d 617, 620 (1957)
(explaining that taking private property perpetuates hardship and oppression).
26. State Highway Dep't v. Noble, 114 Ga. App. 3, 7-8, 150 S.E.2d 175, 177 (1966).
27. State Highway Dep't v. Hood, 118 Ga. App. 720, 720, 165 S.E.2d 601,602-03 (1968).
28. Id. at 721-22, 165 S.E.2d 601, 603-04.
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uniqueness, the court in Williams v. State Highway Department29 held
that for a business owner to recover damages for partial loss of a
business, some evidence of a unique value must be presented.3"
Quoting the trial court, the court of appeals stated,
"In the absence of a showing of 'a special or unique value' to the owner,
the damage to a business by a partial taking of the land is no basis for
compensation, except evidence of such damage may be given to the jury
to help establish market value of the property."3'
It is important to note that the prohibition against recovery of business
damages was conditional upon the absence of uniqueness because
Williams would later be misread for the proposition that the owner of
property may not recover business damages for partial business loss
under any circumstances. 2
The drift toward the uniqueness requirement continued in Hinson v.
Department of Transportation, in which the court phrased the rule as
follows: "The destruction or loss of a business being operated upon the
condemned property requires compensation where the land is shown to
be 'unique.'"34 In this phrasing, the word "where" is ambiguous; it can
be understood as "in any case that" or as "if and only if." If the latter,
it would extend the uniqueness requirement even to the total destruction
of a business, which the court in Bowers addressed. Significantly, the
court in Hinson upheld the jury verdict against the owner's business
damage claim because of evidence that the owner "would not be damaged
by the relocation of his business."35
Two years later, in 1977, the court showed that it understood Hinson
in the latter sense by upholding a business damage award in a total
taking case "[b]ecause there [was] evidence of a 'unique' value of the
condemned land" to the owner.36 In 1978 the court capped the process
by explaining that the uniqueness requirement developed in cases after
Bowers does not conflict with Bowers but instead "creates a highly
practical presumption which says that, as a matter of law, business
losses cannot be attributed to the condemnation unless the property had

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
(1977).

124 Ga. App. 645, 185 S.E.2d 616 (1971).
Id. at 647, 185 S.E.2d at 618.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 48-50.
135 Ga. App. 258, 217 S.E.2d 606 (1975).
Id. at 259, 217 S.E.2d at 607.
Id., 217 S.E.2d at 608.
Kessler v. Department of Transp., 142 Ga. App. 170, 170, 235 S.E.2d 636, 637
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some uniqueness for the business." 7 Thus, by 1978, to recover for any
loss of business, an owner had to prove that the property was in some
sense unique.
Before Bowers, how to define the element of uniqueness that would
authorize a recovery of peculiar value in excess of market value was an
issue that simmered in the court of appeals.3" When uniqueness
became an essential element of a separate business damage claim, the
issue came to a full boil. The history of the appellate litigation over this
issue is ably recounted in the leading case, Departmentof Transportation
v. 2.734 Acres of Land,39 in which the court reviewed various concepts
of uniqueness adduced in "a convoluted maze of seemingly irreconcilable
decisions" and concluded that evidence of any one of the three previously
competing concepts (described below) would justify an award of
compensation exceeding market value, including business damages.4 °
First, under the "locality test," property is unique "'[i]f the property
must be duplicated for the business to survive, and if there is no
substantially comparable property within the area.'"4 1 Second, under

37. MARTA v. Ply-Marts, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 482, 483-84, 241 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1978).
38. Compare Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Troncalli, 111 Ga. App. 515, 518, 142 S.E.2d
93, 94-95 (1965) (focusing on the inability to relocate a business on similar property in the
same customer area), with City of Gainesville v. Chambers, 118 Ga. App. 25, 26-28, 162
S.E.2d 460, 462-63 (1968) (criticizing Troncalli as overly broad and too inclusive of almost
all real property and focusing instead on the characteristics of the property that lack value
in the general market but that have peculiar value to the owner).
39. 168 Ga. App. 541, 309 S.E.2d 816 (1983).
40. Id. at 543-45, 309 S.E.2d at 819-20.
41. Id. at 543, 309 S.E.2d at 819 (quoting Troncalli, 111 Ga. App. at 518, 142 S.E.2d
at 95).
Property can be found unique under this rule when it is the best location for the
particular business. See, e.g., Department of Transp. v. Livingston, 202 Ga. App. 67, 67-68,
413 S.E.2d 249,249-50 (1991) (gas station); DeKalb County v. Glaze, 189 Ga. App. 1, 4, 375
S.E.2d 66, 69 (1988) (grocery store); Cobb County v. Crain, 172 Ga. App. 594, 594-95, 323
S.E.2d 890, 891 (1984) (automobile body repair shop); Department of Transp. v. Clower,
170 Ga. App. 750, 752-53, 318 S.E.2d 161, 163 (1984) (liquor store); City of Atlanta v.
Hadjisimos, 168 Ga. App. 840, 840-41, 310 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1983) (automobile repair shop);
DeKalb County v. Cowan, 151 Ga. App. 753, 754-55, 261 S.E.2d 478, 480 (1979) (antique
store); Kessler v. Department of Transp., 142 Ga. App. 170, 170, 235 S.E.2d 636, 637 (1977)
(liquor store).
High visibility on major thoroughfares with easy access may make a location unique
under this concept. See, e.g., Department of Transp. v. A.R.C. Sec., Inc., 189 Ga. App. 34,
34-36, 375 S.E.2d 42, 43-44 (1988); Smiway, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 178 Ga. App.
414, 417,343 S.E.2d 497, 500 (1986); Department of Transp. v. White, 173 Ga. App. 68, 71,
325 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1984).
Location adjoining a particular source of business may make a property unique. MARTA
v. Ply-Marts, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 482, 483, 241 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1978) (next to railroad
facilities); Glynn County v. Victor, 143 Ga. App. 198, 199, 237 S.E.2d 701, 702 (1977) (meal

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

the "value to the owner test," property is unique if it is "'property with
characteristics of location or construction which limit its usefulness, and
therefore, its value, to the particular owner of it, so that these elements
'
of value cannot pass to a third party.'" 42
Finally, under the "no market
if
it
is
"'generally
not of a type bought or
value test," property is unique
43
sold on the open market.'

ticket arrangement with nearby bus company).
Absence of similar properties nearby with business-critical amenities makes a property
unique. Department of Transp. v. 2.953 Acres of Land, 219 Ga. App. 45, 50, 463 S.E.2d
912, 917 (1995).
Inability to purchase similar property with the amount of money tendered by the
condemnor may support a finding of uniqueness. Troncalli, 111 Ga. App. at 519, 142
S.E.2d at 95.
Even failure of the business at a new location may show that the original location was
unique. Crain, 172 Ga. App. at 595, 323 S.E.2d at 891; 2.734 Acres of Land, 168 Ga. App.
at 546, 309 S.E.2d at 821.
Under this rule, property may be found to be unique if the owner relocates a few blocks
away and the business nonetheless loses some or all of its normal trade. Department of
Transp. v. Bales, 197 Ga. App. 862, 865, 400 S.E.2d 21, 24 (1990).
42. 168 Ga. App. at 544, 309 S.E.2d at 819 (quoting Chambers, 118 Ga. App. at 27, 162
S.E.2d at 462-63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Some cases hold that the peculiar benefit must relate to characteristics of the land or of
the owner's use of it and not to the owner's personal characteristics alone. See, e.g.,
Department of Transp. v. Metts, 208 Ga. App. 401, 402, 430 S.E.2d 622, 623-24 (1993).
However, others have approved findings of uniqueness when the owner is retired and is
using the property for retirement income that he could collect without paying management
fees, Fulton County v. Winkles, 176 Ga. App. 690, 691, 337 S.E.2d 453, 454-55 (1985), and
when the owner is too old to seek a job from the owner of other property, Troncalli, 111 Ga.
App. at 519, 142 S.E.2d at 95.
Longevity of an operation at one location may give the owner benefits that a purchaser
would not obtain, thereby giving the property a unique value to the owner. Department
of Transp. v. Livingston, 202 Ga. App. 67, 68, 413 S.E.2d 249, 250 (1991). Likewise,
evidence showing that the particular property is important for the continued well-being of
the owner's business operation justifies a finding of uniqueness. Crain, 172 Ga. App. at
595, 323 S.E.2d at 891; Hadjisimos, 168 Ga. App. at 841, 310 S.E.2d at 572.
Particular facilities that are built into the subject property and that distinguish it from
otherwise similar properties may justify a finding of uniqueness. 2.953 Acres of Land, 219
Ga. App. at 50, 463 S.E.2d at 917.
43. 168 Ga. App. at 544, 309 S.E.2d at 819-20 (quoting Department of Transp. v.
Eastern Oil Co., 149 Ga. App. 504, 505, 254 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1979)).
Archetypical examples are churches, college buildings, clubhouses, golf clubs, schools, and
cemeteries. Macon-Bibb County Water & Sewerage Auth. v. Reynolds, 165 Ga. App. 348,
353, 299 S.E.2d 594, 598 (1983); Department of Transp. v. James Co., 183 Ga. App. 798,
798, 360 S.E.2d 56, 57 (1987).
More common examples of business properties that have been found to be unique because
they are not typically bought and sold include service stations, Livingston, 202 Ga. App.
at 68, 413 S.E.2d at 250; Winkles, 176 Ga. App. at 691, 337 S.E.2d at 455; Eastern Oil Co.,
149 Ga. App. at 505, 254 S.E.2d at 731, convenience stores, Bales, 197 Ga. App. at 865, 400
S.E.2d at 24, and veterinary clinics, Department of Transp. v. Harris, 201 Ga. App. 160,
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For reasons given below," uniqueness should be conceived as an
application of the doctrine of mitigation of damages. If the owner can
mitigate damages by reasonable means, such as relocating the business,
the owner should do so and should recover the reasonable costs of doing
so. On the other hand, if the owner cannot do so reasonably, the owner
will not have been justly and adequately compensated unless the owner
recovers at least the lost value of the business operated on the property.
III.

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN PROBLEM AREAS

Unfortunately, business damage case law has developed several areas
of conflicting rules, scholastic distinctions without substance, and
substantial departures from the text of the constitution, precedent, and
reason. This is due in part to the absence of a comprehensive approach
to business loss questions, in part to the aggressive positions taken by
practitioners on both sides, and in part to faulty reasoning. This section
of the Article looks at these contentious issues critically and suggests the
proper resolutions.
A. The Distinctions Between Landowner and Tenant and Between
Total and PartialDestruction of Business, for Purposes of the Recoverability of Damages,Are Unfounded
Before the uniqueness rule was established as a universal element in
all business damage cases, the court of appeals held that to recover for
business damages caused by a partial taking of land, the property must
be unique: "In the absence of a showing of 'a special or unique value' to
the owner, the damage to a business by a partial taking of the land is
no basis for compensation," except that it may show market value.4"
This rule was quoted in the later case of Department of Transportation
v. Dent,"' though the requirement that the property be unique was by
then redundant.47 The rule as stated in Dent, however, was misconstrued in a later case, Department of Transportationv. Kendricks," as
standing for the proposition that an owner, unlike a tenant, could not

161, 410 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1991).
Also unique under this rule are lesser real property interests such as easements, Housing
Auth. of Atlanta v. Southern Rwy., 245 Ga. 229, 230, 264 S.E.2d 174, 175 (1980), and
tenancies at will, Hayes v. City of Atlanta, 1 Ga. App. 25, 26, 57 S.E. 1087, 1089 (1907).
44. See infra Part IV.D.
45. Williams, 124 Ga. App. at 647, 185 S.E.2d at 618.
46. 142 Ga. App. 94, 95, 235 S.E.2d 610, 612 (1977).
47. See supra text accompanying note 37.
48. 148 Ga. App. 242, 250 S.E.2d 854 (1978).
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recover for business losses unless the business was totally destroyed.4
The court apparently ignored the qualifying language "in the absence of
a showing of 'a special or unique value.'""
In Department of Transportationv. Dixie Highway Bottle Shop, Inc.,51
the supreme court attempted to resolve the resulting tension between
Dent and Kendricks.52 In a per curiam decision, the court decided that
there was no conflict between the two cases, though in so doing, it had
to adopt Kendricks's misreading of Dent.53 The court concluded,
When the business belongs to the landowner, total destruction of the
business at the location must be proven before business losses may be
recovered as a separate element of compensation. On the other hand,
when the business belongs to a separate lessee, the lessee may recover
for business losses as an element of compensation separate from the
value of the land whether the destruction of his business is total or
merely partial, provided only that the loss is not remote or speculative.54
The court explained the difference between landowners and tenants as
based on the doctrine that the use of the property and title of the
property are merged in the owner's case, but are separate and distinct
in a case in which the owner leases property to a business tenant.55
Thus, the court concluded that a landowner may not recover for business
losses as a separate item of recovery unless there is a "total destruction
of the business at the location," whereas a tenant may recover a separate
award of business loss even if it is merely partial."6
The interests of landowner and business owner may in fact be merged
when an owner is operating a business on the property,5 7 but that fact
is insignificant when the value of the owner's lost business exceeds the
market value of the property taken. One will search the chain of

49. Id. at 245-46, 250 S.E.2d at 857-58.
50. Williams, 124 Ga. App. at 647, 185 S.E.2d at 618.
51. 245 Ga. 314, 265 S.E.2d 10 (1980).
52. Id. at 314-15, 265 S.E.2d at 10.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 315, 265 S.E.2d at 10 (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 314-15, 265 S.E.2d at 10.
56. Id. at 315, 265 S.E.2d at 10. This disparity has led to at least one equal protection
challenge, which the court noted, but did not resolve. See Timmers Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Department of Transp., 261 Ga. 270, 271 n.1, 404 S.E.2d 121, 122 n.1 (1991); see also
Richmond County v. 0.153 Acres, 208 Ga. App. 208, 210-11 & n.1, 430 S.E.2d 47, 50 & n.1
(1993).
57. 245 Ga. at 314-15, 265 S.E.2d at 10.
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authority culminating in Dixie Highway Bottle Shop 5 8 in vain for an
explanation of the significance of this merger concept. At most, those
cases express the assumption that the value of the property for a
particular business is reflected in the market value for the property.
This assumption will normally be true when the market provides many
suitable sites for the owner's business. In such a fortunate situation, the
owner can sell the current site for market value and replace it with a
similar one for roughly the same market value. As the many cases that
explore the uniqueness principle make clear, this assumption is not
always true.59 In fact, one may expect over time, with increasing
development of vacant land and increasing land-use restrictions, that
this assumption will prove to be increasingly less justified. In any case,
the progression from a general rule (business value is generally included
in market value) to a universal rule (in partial takings when the
landowner operates the business, business value is always included in
market value) is a logical error that occurs frequently in Georgia's
eminent domain jurisprudence.
Both the owner-operator and the lessee-operator have property rights
in the land and in their businesses, and a damage to the business of one
is not conceptually different from damage to the other's business."° The
business value of the property to the landowner-operator or tenantoperator may be greater than the market value of the land or leasehold.
If so, and if either loses that value, an award of mere market value will
not provide the compensation that the constitution requires. Certainly,
the tenant and landowner may have different options to mitigate
damages, but the mere merger of interests of the landowner-operator in
one person does not extinguish the business value of the property. If

58. See Kendricks, 148 Ga. App. at 244-47,250 S.E.2d at 857; Dent, 142 Ga. App. at 95,
235 S.E.2d at 612; Williams, 124 Ga. App. at 647, 185 S.E.2d at 618; Bowers v. Fulton
County, 122 Ga. App. 45, 49-50, 176 S.E.2d 219, 224 (1970) ("Bowers I"); Hood, 118 Ga.
App. at 721-22, 165 S.E.2d at 603. Including Bowers H in this chain also requires a
misreading of that case. While Bowers II suggests that in cases involving a partial taking,
the measure of damages would be the loss in market value, the decision refers to the
market value of the business rather than market value of the realty, as opposed to other
potential measures of business loss such as "loss of profits, loss of customers or possibly
what might be termed a decrease in the earning capacity." 122 Ga. App. at 50, 176 S.E.2d
at 224.
59. See supra notes 41-43.
60. In an earlier case, the supreme court explained that
the owner of property of a given rental value is entitled, if he elects to be at once
his own landlord and tenant, to get an amount of enjoyment out of it equal to the

sum he would be obliged to pay as rent for premises of a like rental value
belonging to another.
Swift v. Broyles, 115 Ga. 885, 888, 42 S.E. 277, 279 (1902).
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merger truly extinguished the business value of property, it would be
impossible for the landowner to recover business losses in any case,
including a case involving the total destruction of a business. In
addition, it would be completely irrational to hold that the landowner's
interests merged subject to later severance in a case of total, but not
partial, destruction of the business.
These distinctions conflict with both the language and the spirit of the
constitution. Specifically, in some cases, compensating only for the
market value of real property does not adequately compensate the
business owner for his losses. This, in turn, runs a serious risk of
violating the constitutional commandment of just compensation.6 The
supreme court should reform the law to erase these distinctions that
deprive citizens of protections guaranteed under the Georgia Constitution.
B. The Distinctions Between Permanent and Temporary Business
Losses and Between Temporary ConsequentialDamages and
Temporary Business Losses, for Purposes of the Recoverability of
Damages, Are Unfounded
Another issue arises when the effects of the taking are temporary,
either because the business owner moves the business away from the
affected property or because the condemnor takes a temporary interest
in the property, typically in the form of an easement for construction.
The former situation occurred in Housing Authority of Atlanta v.
Southern Railway Co.,2 in which the condemnee sought business
damages when it relocated the business. 3 The court quoted the trial
court's instruction "'that a mere temporary loss of profits associated with
the extinguishment by condemnation of Condemnee's property interest
is not a proper element for consideration in determining just and
adequate compensation,""' but it did not pass on the validity of the
instruction because the condemnee did not appeal the issue. Instead,
the condemnor appealed, contending that the jury's verdict awarded
double damages for the costs of relocating the business and for loss of
business. The condemnor apparently argued that the condemnee should
not recover the costs of relocation of a business when it also recovers for
the loss of the same business because the latter award provides complete

See GA. CONST. art I, § 3, para. 1(a).
62. 245 Ga. 229, 264 S.E.2d 174 (1980).
63. Id. at 229-30, 264 S.E.2d at 175.
61.

64. Id. at 232, 264 S.E.2d at 176. The source or rationale of the trial court's instruction
was not given. No Georgia source that supports this principle has been discovered.
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compensation.65 The supreme court cited the trial court's instruction
to show that the condemnee could not have received a double recovery
because the jury would have awarded business damages for the business
that was permanently lost, as opposed to the business lost from the first
site that was ultimately regained by relocation to the second site.66
Hence, the instruction more than sufficed to avoid a double recovery for
permanent business losses, but it was at most dictum regarding any
potential challenge by a condemnee that the lower court's instruction
resulted in a failure to obtain compensation for temporary business
losses that occurred while the business was reestablishing itself.
The second situation occurred in Hillman v. Departmentof Transportation," in which the condemnor took a construction easement over
part of a parking lot for a period of months.68 Rejecting an implication
in earlier cases that damage to the remaining property could be shown
only if the damage is a "'continuous and permanent incident of the
improvement,'"69 the supreme court found "that the only proper
distinction to be made in cases of temporary takings is the same
requirement in force for permanent takings."" Furthermore, "[w]hile
the condemnee is not permitted to recover for the inconveniences of the
construction process, the constitution requires that damages, including
consequential damages, be paid. The constitution does not distinguish
Although most of
between permanent and temporary damage."7
Hillman was phrased in terms of a recovery of consequential damages,72 its reasoning led the full bench of the court of appeals in Department of Transportation v. Hillside Motors, Inc.73 to conclude that the
Georgia Constitution requires that temporary business losses be
recoverable.74
The problem in this area arose in Buck's Service Station, Inc. v.
75
in which both appellate courts mistook
Departmentof Transportation,
the trial court's jury instruction in Southern Railway as an appellate
holding against the recovery of business damages caused by a temporary

65. Id. at 231-32, 264 S.E.2d at 175-76.
66. Id., 264 S.E.2d at 176-77.
67. 257 Ga. 338, 359 S.E.2d 637 (1987).
68. Id. at 338, 359 S.E.2d at 638.
69. Id. (quoting State Highway Dep't v. Hollywood Baptist Church of Rome, 112 Ga.
App. 857, 860, 146 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1965)).
70. Id. at 339, 359 S.E.2d at 639.
71. Id. at 340, 359 S.E.2d at 640 (emphasis added).

72. Id. at 338, 359 S.E.2d at 638.
73.
74.
75.

192 Ga. App. 637, 385 S.E.2d 746 (1989).
Id. at 639, 385 S.E.2d at 748 (citing Hillman, 257 Ga. at 340, 359 S.E.2d at 640).
259 Ga. 825, 387 S.E.2d 877 (1990), aftg, 191 Ga. App. 341, 381 S.E.2d 516 (1989).
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6 The
taking and attempted to reconcile that "holding" with Hillman."
supreme court ruled,

We expressly hold that evidence of any business losses which result in
a diminution of the value of a condemnee's business is admissible.
However, evidence of temporary loss of business is admissible not for
the purpose of recovering for the temporary loss of business but for the
limited purpose of demonstrating fair market value of the land not
taken immediately after the taking. We reach this conclusion because
business property facing loss of business may suffer a diminution in
fair market value. This is true whether the losses occur because of the
condemnation of a temporary construction easement or whether they
occur because of a permanent taking."
The court thereby precluded the admission of temporary loss of business
evidence for the purpose of recovering for that loss, although it allowed
the admission of business loss evidence for the express purpose of
showing the value of property interests immediately after the taking.8
The court did so despite recognizing that the owner could recover for
consequential damages that are caused by the same temporary taking
that resulted in temporary business losses. 9 Hence, the court established two distinctions that are not apparent in the text of the Georgia
Constitution: (1) temporary business losses may not be recovered,
though otherwise identical permanent business losses may be recovered;
and (2) loss in value to the realty caused by a temporary taking may be
recovered, but lost profits caused by the same taking may not be
recovered. 0
Undoubtedly, if a private citizen did temporary construction work on
another's property without the other's consent and injured that party's
business, the loss would be recognized as a compensable business
damage. "'In a continuing, abatable nuisance case, the plaintiff is not
limited to a recovery of rental value or market value; rather, he may
recover any special damages whether the injury is of a temporary or a
permanent nature.'"'

76. 259 Ga. at 826-27, 387 S.E.2d at 878; 191 Ga. App. at 341-42, 381 S.E.2d at 517.
Because the misread case did not have occasion to address the validity of the supposed
rule, and because the courts in Buck's Service Station simply assumed that the rule existed,
there is no appellate discussion in Georgia that explains why this supposed rule is valid.
77. 259 Ga. at 827, 387 S.E.2d at 878.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 826-27, 387 S.E.2d at 878-79.
81. Fulton County v. Wheaton, 252 Ga. 49, 51, 310 S.E.2d 910, 911-12 (1984) (quoting
City of Columbus v. Myszka, 246 Ga. 571, 573, 272 S.E.2d 302, 305 (1980)).
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Because two distinctions have been imposed on the law of eminent
domain that cannot be justified in the text of the constitution or by
persuasive reasoning, the results appear arbitrary and unfair. Fidelity
to the constitution demands substantial justification for a rule that
permits recovery of permanent business losses while precluding recovery
of temporary business losses. This rule contravenes the only reasoned
analysis of the constitution's text, which does not distinguish between
permanent and temporary damages.82 The supreme court should
reform the law to erase these unfair distinctions.
C. The Law Should Allow the Valuation of Business Damage Claims
in Terms of Lost Profits in Appropriate Cases
Assuming that an owner has jumped the hurdles discussed above and
may assert a business damage claim, there are two threads of Georgia
cases that reach contradictory conclusions about the measure of those
damages. One thread maintains that the only appropriate measure of
business damages is the difference in market value of the business
before and after the taking."3 In this line of cases, the existence of lost
profits, lost customers, and decreased earning capacity of the business
may evidence a loss in business value, but it is not a separate item of
recovery.84 This will be called the "diminution only" theory. Another
thread holds that lost business value and lost profits are alternative
measures of value, so that an owner may recover either in an appropriate case, at least when the owner supplies sufficient information to allow
a calculation of net profits with reasonable certainty 5 This will be
called the "valuation alternatives" theory.
The diminution only theory is erroneous, and more flexibility should
be allowed in the assessment of business damage claims in eminent
domain law as in other fields of law. The diminution only theory has
never been explained by an appellate court. It arose in Bowers II

82.

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.

83. See, e.g., MARTA v. Martin, 193 Ga. App. 566, 567,388 S.E.2d 346, 347 (1989); Old
South Bottle Shop, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 175 Ga. App. 295, 295, 333 S.E.2d 127,
128 (1985); Bowers II, 122 Ga. App. at 50, 176 S.E.2d at 224.
84. See, e.g., MARTA v. Martin, 193 Ga. App. 566, 567,388 S.E.2d 346, 347 (1989); Old
South Bottle Shop, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 175 Ga. App. 295, 295, 333 S.E.2d 127,

128 (1985); Bowers II, 122 Ga. App. at 50, 176 S.E.2d at 224.
85. Bowers, 221 Ga. at 734, 146 S.E.2d at 888; Department of Transp. v. Morris, 194
Ga. App. 813, 814, 392 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1990); Department of Transp. v. Hillside Motors,
Inc., 192 Ga. App. 637, 642-43, 385 S.E.2d 746, 751 (1989); Mauney v. Department of
Transp., 169 Ga. App. 563, 563, 313 S.E.2d 782, 783 (1984); Hadjisimos, 168 Ga. App. at
842, 310 S.E.2d at 573; Department of Transp. v. Vest, 160 Ga. App. 368, 369-70, 287
S.E.2d 85, 86-87 (1981).
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spontaneously, and the court held it to be the proper measure "in our
opinion."8 6 The court of appeals in Bowers II evidently overlooked the
precise holding of the original Bowers decision, in which the supreme
court ruled upon the enumeration of error that the trial court refused to
give instructions five, six, and seven. 7 Charge seven dealt with
removal costs,"5 and charge six dealt with "'loss, injury to, or diminution of business,"'8 9 while charge five dealt with "'loss of profits."'9 °
After providing its analysis, which established that business losses may
be recovered, the supreme court found "the requested instructions
pertinent and applicable to the issues of the case. In this situation it
was error to refuse to give them in charge to the jury."" Therefore, the
supreme court approved a jury instruction for the recovery of lost profits
apart from diminished business value. 2
Furthermore, there is no constitutional basis for a prohibition against
lost profits as a measure of recovery in appropriate cases. Lost profits
and other business damages are considered just compensation in other
kinds of cases.9 " There is nothing in the constitution that prevents lost
profits or other business damages from being just and adequate
compensation in condemnation cases.9"
Practical considerations suggest that there will be cases in which
recovery of lost profits will be the best and most appropriate measure of
a business's damages. First, the business may often be valuable because
of its ongoing ownership, which would be lost upon sale to others.
Market value of the business for sale would yield an artificially low

86. 122 Ga. App. at 50, 176 S.E.2d at 224.
87. 221 Ga. at 734, 146 S.E.2d at 888.
88. Id. at 735-36, 146 S.E.2d at 888-89.
89. Id. at 735, 146 S.E.2d at 888.
90. Id. at 734-35, 146 S.E.2d at 888.
91. Id. at 738, 146 S.E.2d at 890.
92. Id. at 738, 741, 146 S.E.2d at 888, 892.
93. See, e.g., Bennett v. Smith, 245 Ga. 725, 726-27, 267 S.E.2d 19, 20 (1980) (negligent
supply of contaminated feed to plaintiffs hen house); Barham v. Grant, 185 Ga. 601, 605,
196 S.E. 43, 47 (1938) (road change nuisance); Brunswick & W.R.R. v. Hardey & Co., 112
Ga. 604, 607-09, 37 S.E. 888, 889-90 (1901) (road work nuisance); Gaines v. Crompton &
Knowles Corp., 190 Ga. App. 863, 864, 380 S.E.2d 498, 500 (1989) (breach of noncompeti-

tion agreement justified damages for lost net profits, lost customers, and lost employees);
Gilmore Int'l Travel, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 183 Ga. App. 116, 117-18, 358
S.E.2d 279, 280 (1987) (fraud); Moultrie Farm Ctr, Inc. v. Sparkman, 171 Ga. App. 736,
738, 320 S.E.2d 863, 866 (1984) (contaminated feed for cows); Summerfield v. Decinque,
143 Ga. App. 351, 352-53, 238 S.E.2d 712, 714-15 (1977) (car wreck's effect on owner's art
gallery).
94. See GA. CONST. art. I, § 3, para. 1(a).
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estimation of its true value to the owner.95 Recognizing this fact is
consistent with the definition of property as embracing not only the right

of the owner to sell it, but also the owner's "right to possess, use, [and]
enjoy" the property.96

Diminished market value should be rejected

when the government's action does not diminish the owner's ability to
sell the business as much as it damages the operation of the business.
Because a business can be damaged in a variety of ways, there is no a
priori reason why there should be only one way of measuring that
damage. 97

Second, market value may be inappropriate for a number of reasons.

A market standard should be rejected when, for any reason, what the
hypothetical market purchaser gains is not equivalent to what the owner
loses by reason of the condemnation. For example, a business that has

minimal market value because it is merely breaking even may lose a lot
of money during a construction process that causes a compensable loss.
As it was erroneous in Bowers to instruct the jury that the constitution
mandates a market valuation of property,9" it should be erroneous to
assert a similar position about business values. Diminished market
value of a business cannot exist when the business is a franchise or

leasehold, which is, by its terms, nontransferable. In addition, some
businesses have no market value because there is no market for them.
A business may be a one-of-a-kind business or a monopoly, which would
not be sought by typical investors. Market value, by measuring a
permanent transfer of ownership, is inapposite when the issue is a
temporary business loss because of road construction99 or any other
compensable temporary business loss.

95. Note that in business cases, the "value to the owner" standard (as opposed to a
market standard) is not subject to the abuses that can occur in cases involving mere
residential property. In business cases the value to the owner rests upon cash transactions
that can be verified and that supply objective criteria for determining value. Therefore,
unlike the need to reject testimony of the sentimental value of a home, there is no reason
to reject this standard in business cases.
96. Bowers, 221 Ga. at 737, 146 S.E.2d at 890.
97. See, e.g., State Highway Dep't v. Sullivan, 121 Ga. App. 767, 771, 175 S.E.2d 152,
155 (1970) (inventory ofjunkyard car lot valued in terms of sales income because it would
not be feasible to move some of it to a new location).
98. 221 Ga. at 741, 146 S.E.2d at 892 ("The Constitution does not contain any allusion
to fair market value as a criterion for determining just and adequate compensation.").
99. See, e.g., Department of Transp. v. Martin, 174 Ga. App. 616, 616-17, 331 S.E.2d
45, 45-46 (1985) (gas station could not operate during period of construction); Hillside
Motors, Inc., 192 Ga. App. at 638-39, 385 S.E.2d at 748 ("To say that a business loss that
occurs over a specific period of time (as opposed to permanently) is not compensable not
only defies logic but our constitution as well.") (dictum).
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Finally, in some cases, lost profits will be the most simple and direct
measure of damages, and in those cases it should be preferred to a
market approach. °° If lost profits are exceptionally clear and a
business valuation is exceptionally murky, using the former may better
serve the interests of justice. For these reasons, the conflict between
these lines of cases should be resolved, and the supreme court should
authorize a recovery of lost profits in appropriate cases.
D. The Law Should Allow the Valuation of the Underlying Property
in Terms of its Business Value When No Double Recovery Would
Result
In cases in which a business loss is allowed as a separate item of
recovery, allowing the underlying property to be evaluated in accordance
with its income-producing qualities would pose a substantial risk of
double recovery. However, when an owner cannot recover business
damages as a separate item of recovery under one of the above rules, or
chooses not to do so, an issue arises as to whether the owner may elect
to show the actual, peculiar, or unique value of the property in excess of
fair market value as allowed by case law before Bowers.'' Unfortunately, this issue has been obscured by several recent conflicting
decisions.
Under the correct view that the underlying real property interest may
be valued in terms of a business income approach, which is reflected in
the supreme court's recent unanimous decision in Department of
Transportation v. Edwards,"' an appraiser may apply the "income
method" to the business income of the property to determine what a
well-informed buyer would pay and what a seller would accept for the
property before and after the sale."0 3 Likewise, in Housing Authority
of Atlanta v. Southern Railway Co., 0 an appraiser evaluated a
railroad easement in terms of the business income that it was used to
generate, and the supreme court unanimously held that it was proper "to
instruct the jury on lost profits as a means of awarding just and

100. See, e.g., Whitaker Acres, Inc. v. Schrenk, 170 Ga. App. 238, 241, 316 S.E.2d 537,
539-40 (1984).
101. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
102. 267 Ga. 733, 736-37, 482 S.E.2d 260, 263-64 (1997).
103. Id. at 736, 482 S.E.2d at 263. Contrary to the opinions of some appraisers and
commentators, the case law developed in this section clearly authorizes the use of business
income, not merely rental income, for calculations of the value of property under the
income approach. The view that considers only rental income arbitrarily privileges the
position of the absentee landlord as the standard by which to judge the value of the
property of everyone else.
104. 245 Ga. 229, 264 S.E.2d 174 (1980).
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adequate compensation because the income approach necessarily takes
into account what future earnings would be were the property interest
not extinguished."' °5 This holding is consistent with decisions in other
areas of the law in which a party introduced business profits and losses
to prove the value of real property interests, some of which expressly
recognize that a party could thereby indirectly recover business profits
if the party persuades a jury that business profits0 6are the best measure
of the value of the underlying property interests.
Unfortunately, two recent decisions have introduced doubts about
these principles. In Bill Ledford Motors, Inc. v. Departmentof Transportation,0 7 the court of appeals rejected a claim that a tenant's leasehold
interest should be valued in terms of the value of the business operating
on the premises, even though the property was unique and the tenant
was not allowed to seek a separate award of business damages because
of the temporary nature of the damage.' ° The court based its decision
on the general rule that fair market value is the appropriate measure of
damages, but it added the rhetorical question from Bowers that, when
a $100,000 business is located in a $5000 building, how can the value of
the business be included in the value of the property?'
The answer
to this question comes from the numerous peculiar value cases:
normally the business cannot be included in the realty, but when the

105. Id. at 231, 264 S.E.2d at 176; see also Hall County v. Merritt, 233 Ga. App. 526,
528, 504 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1998) (cash flow analysis to determine value of landfill);
Richmond County v. 0.153 Acres of Land, 208 Ga. App. 208, 209, 430 S.E.2d 47, 49 (1993)
("evidence of damage to the business may not be the basis for compensation except as
evidence to help establish the market value of the remainder of the property," though an
owner may not combine this approach with a traditional fair market value approach to
claim double damages); Coastal Equities, Inc. v. Chatham County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 201
Ga. App. 571, 572, 411 S.E.2d 540, 541 (1991) (approving appraisal of motel based on its
gross income even though its income depended on many factors other than the value of the
real estate); HillsideMotors, Inc., 192 Ga. App. at 642-43, 385 S.E.2d at 751 (income losses
used for car dealership during periods in which dust from construction interfered with car
sales); Department of Transp. v,A.R.C. Sec'y, Inc., 189 Ga. App. 34, 37-38, 375 S.E.2d 42,
45 (1988) (property appraised by method including its income stream); Sullivan, 121 Ga.
App. at 771, 175 S.E.2d at 155 (inventory of junkyard car lot valued in terms of sales
income); City of Rome v. Lecroy, 59 Ga. App. 644, 645-46, 1 S.E.2d 759, 760 (1939)
(upholding tenant's suit for impairment of access for fifteen days based on lost profits of
a business reflected in a sales decline compared with "the usual and ordinary sales for that
period").
106. See, e.g., Dual Enters., Inc. v. Kingston Atlanta Partners, 211 Ga. App. 108, 111,
438 S.E.2d 90,92 (1993); Carusos v. Briarcliff, Inc., 76 Ga. App. 346,351-52,45 S.E.2d 802,
806-07 (1947).
107. 225 Ga. App. 548, 484 S.E.2d 510 (1997).
108. Id. at 549-51, 484 S.E.2d at 513-14.
109. Id. at 550, 484 S.E.2d at 513 (citing Bowers, 221 Ga. at 739, 146 S.E.2d at 891).
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business is tied to the realty because the realty is unique, then the
realty that has a low fair market value also has a high peculiar value to
the owner, which the market does not reflect." ° Thus, the owner will
be deprived of just compensation if the owner is restricted to a recovery
of fair market value.
Likewise, in Department of Transportation v.Scott,"' the supreme
court rejected an approach that valued the destruction of patented, and
therefore unique, "mother plants" on a farm in terms of loss of income
during the time in which the farmer could grow replacements and
continue sales.'12 However the plants could have been characterized
(as personalty, realty, part of a leasehold, or a business interest), the
plants were property under the constitution, and compensation was due,
but compensation could not be paid unless the objective, incomegenerating value of the tenant's business formed a part of the tenant's
recovery"'
In a particularly brief and puzzling discussion, the
majority ruled that evidence of income loss was irrelevant because the
farmer was not seeking recovery of business losses as a separate
item." 4 The majority failed to explain why the evidence would not be
relevant to the value of the property taken.
Neither the court in Bill Ledford Motors nor the court in Scott
explained how the result in each case could be reconciled with the
peculiar value cases or with the recognition that the constitution protects
the profitable use of property as well as market value. This is particularly troubling because both cases involved claims by tenants, and the
law has always recognized that a tenant does not own the property but
does own the right to use the property for profit.
When a leasehold is condemned, the lessee does not lose the value of
the improved property. The value of the improved property is lost to
the lessor who owned it and who is compensated therefor. The lessee
loses only the use of the improved property for a specified time at a set
amount of rent." 5
The traditional rule that a tenant's interest in a leasehold should be
valued by means of market value, as an item to be bought and sold in
the open market, is usually nothing more than a legal fiction. Reason
suggests that if a tenant loses the use of some property, compensation
should be determined by the value of the tenant's use of the property.

110.

See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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268 Ga. 579, 492 S.E.2d 216 (1997).
Id. at 579-80, 492 S.E.2d at 216-17.
Id. at 580, 492 S.E.2d at 217.
Id.

115. MARTA v. Funk, 263 Ga. 385, 387, 435 S.E.2d 196, 199 (1993).
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Reason does not suggest that the tenant's compensation should be based
on the value of the improved property for rent, which would more
appropriately constitute the measure of the tenant's right to sublease the
property. Tenants generally do not acquire leases for the purpose of
subleasing at a higher rate. Instead, tenants pay to get the use of
property for the purpose of doing business to make profits. A taking
deprives the tenant of those profits. Therefore, the lessee's interest
should be valued not in terms of the right to sublease the property, but
in terms of the right to uninterrupted enjoyment of the premises.
However, mitigation of damages applies in this case too; if the tenant
can lease property with similar utility, the tenant must do so. In such
cases of available similar rental properties, a market value approach is
far more appropriate.
This area of eminent domain law should be reformed for consistency.
Without flouting common sense and Georgia's entire peculiar value
jurisprudence, the courts should recognize that owners of real property
interests have constitutionally protected property rights in the use of
their properties, including the right to use the properties for profits.
When for any reason the business owner cannot avoid the effects of a
condemnation by relocating the profitable enterprise to other property,
the value of the right to use the property for profit should be valued by
those profits.
IV.

A RETURN TO FUNDAMENTALS WILL SOLVE THE PROBLEMS

The decisions discussed above have created a climate in which the
same issues must be litigated in case after case throughout Georgia.
Attorneys for condemnors and condemnees frequently do not agree on
the ground rules for resolving business damages cases, and it is often
difficult to explain to clients why valid claims go unheard. The decisions
in the preceding section of this Article manifest arbitrariness and, it
must be admitted, sloppiness of thought. The situation cries out for
resolution and correction.
Fortunately, a return to constitutional fundamentals provides an
elegant and sound solution to these controversies. The constitution is
the source of all law on the meaning of just and adequate compensation,
and any correct rules for decision must relate back to constitutional
provisions. Under the constitution, the ultimate measure of a citizen's
recovery is and must be "just and adequate compensation."" 6 Anything more or less is simply unconstitutional. The language, history,
and purpose of article I, section 3, paragraph 1(a) of the Georgia

116.

GA. CONST. art. I, § 3, para. 1(a).
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Constitution support the availability of business loss valuations in
appropriate cases, as is true of damage valuations in other types of
cases. The constitution protects the right to use property for profit as
well as the right to sell it. When the value of the right to use the
property exceeds the value of the right to sell the property, just
compensation requires an award based on the higher value unless the
principle of mitigation of damages, which is also applicable in other
types of cases, requires that the owner move the business to other
property.
Conforming the decisions on business loss evidence to the terms of the
constitution will bring consistency to the law. The constitution
contemplates no distinctions between landlord and tenant, permanent
and temporary damages, or total and partial damages for the purpose of
recovery."7 For the law to reflect the constitutional protections, these
distinctions should be abolished. All eminent domain value questions
can be resolved by determining (1) whether the party had a property
right that was taken or damaged, (2) the value of the property right
before the taking or damage, and (3) how much of the value was lost
because of the taking, as opposed to other causes, including the owner's
failure to mitigate damages. The sum of the lost property value is just
and adequate compensation under the constitution.
A.

The Language and Purpose of the Constitution

The terms of article I, section 3, paragraph 1(a) will support an award
based on business losses in appropriate cases. The constitution provides
in pertinent part that "private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first
paid.""' The constitution is not limited by a term such as "private
real estate," or a clause such as "except that compensation shall not
include business losses caused by the taking." It speaks in general
terms. If property is taken or damaged, then "just and adequate
compensation" must be paid." 9
When the constitutional convention used these general terms, it
neither intended to adopt a system of damages different from the
prevailing system of compensatory damages nor authorized the courts to
do so. Instead, it intended to incorporate the conventional law of
damages in similar cases against nongovernmental parties as a known
and accepted framework for deciding eminent domain issues. The
supreme court has stated,

117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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[T]he purpose was, to make the law of damages uniform, so that a
plaintiff could recover against a city or railroad under the same
circumstances that would have authorized a recovery against those not
armed and protected by the power of eminent domain .... The
constitution intended to take away the city's exemption, and to leave
it and the manufacturing company on an equal footing .... Thereafter, what is damage by one is damage by all .... 120
Therefore, "[tihe test is, would the injury, if caused by a private person
without authority of statute, give the plaintiff a cause of action against
such person?"' 2 '
Cases in other fields, particularly nuisance and
trespass, should therefore have precedential value in eminent domain
jurisprudence, subject to the observation that the acts of the condemnor
are lawful. Again, the law applicable to property damage generally
allows a recovery of special damages resulting from the taking, whether
temporary or permanent. 122
Therefore, the courts should review
existing or proposed rules in eminent domain cases with a careful eye to
determine whether the rule is consistent with the general law of
damages for injury to property.
The convention that framed the terms of article I, section 3, paragraph
1(a) understood compensation as requiring that the property owner be
put in the position he would have been in but for the other's acts, no
better and no worse. "Just and adequate compensation for the real
property that is taken is certainly intended to put a condemnee in
substantially the same financial position that he was in prior to the
taking."" 2 Thus, "the measure of damages for property taken by the
right of eminent domain, being compensatory in its nature, is the
pecuniary loss sustained by the owner, taking into consideration all
relevant factors." 1"' Owners should be put in substantially the same
financial position that they would have obtained if the condemnation or
construction had not occurred.
B.

The Relevance of Market Value

The constitution, supplemented only by general law, also explains the
relationship of fair market value to just and adequate compensation,

120. Austin v. Augusta Terminal Ry., 108 Ga. 671,675, 34 S.E. 852,853 (1899); see also
Mayor of Albany v. Sikes, 94 Ga. 30, 31, 20 S.E. 257, 257 (1894) ("[A municipal] corporation
will be liable to make compensation in damages, if an individual would be liable for causing
injuries or damages of the same kind.").
121. Peel v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga. 138, 140, 11 S.E. 582, 583 (1890).
122. See supra notes 7-8 and text accompanying note 81.
123. Funk, 263 Ga. at 385, 435 S.E.2d at 198.
124. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, Inc., 91 Ga. App. at 882, 87 S.E.2d at 673.
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when other measures of damages are appropriate, and why property
should be unique for alternative measures to apply.
The Georgia Supreme Court has held that "[tihe Constitution does not
contain any allusion to fair market value as a criterion for determining
just and adequate compensation."' 25 Therefore, there is no inherent
or necessary connection between just compensation and fair market
value. Regardless of whether fair market value is more or less than the
amount which justly and adequately compensates the citizen, the latter
amount must be awarded.
Instead of being necessarily connected, fair market value is relevant
because most fee simple property has some value for sale in the
marketplace, and taking the property takes away the owner's right to
sell it. However, the right to sell the property is not the only valuable
right that a property owner has.
"The term 'property' is a very comprehensive one, and is used not only
to signify things real and personal owned, but to designate the right of
ownership and that which is subject to be owned and enjoyed. The
term [property] comprehends not only the thing possessed, but also, in
strict legal parlance, means the rights of the owner in relation to land
or a thing; the right of a person to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of it,
and the corresponding right to exclude others from the use." 2 '
Thus, along with the right to dispose of property, the constitution
protects the right to possess, use, and enjoy property. These two
categories, value in exchange and value in use, are recognized by law
and appraisers.'27
Fair market value measures the value of the owner's right to dispose
of the property, 2 s which is its value in exchange. There is almost
always some ascertainable market for the property for which a pecuniary
value can be set.'29 Property also has a value in use because "[t]he

125. Bowers, 221 Ga. at 741, 146 S.E.2d at 892.
126. Id. at 737, 146 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting Woodside v. City of Atlanta, 214 Ga. 75, 83,
103 S.E.2d 108, 114 (1958)) (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also O.C.G.A.
§ 51-9-1 (1982) ("The right of enjoyment of private property being an absolute right of every
citizen, every act of another which unlawfully interferes with such enjoyment is a tort for
which an action shall lie.").
127. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL
ESTATE 16-21 (9th ed. 1987); see also Davis v. East Tenn. Va. & Ga. Ry., 87 Ga. 605, 61112, 13 S.E. 567, 569 (1891) (owner could not recover for lost value of land because the
improvements increased the value, but owner could recover for lost value in use without
reduction because of the increased land value).
128. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, supra note 127, at 16-20.
129. Id. at 17-18.
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value of property consists [ultimately] in its use."13 ° This value in use
is the pecuniary value of those rights of use. ' However, there may
or may not be an ascertainable standard to measure the value in use of
particular property.'32
Fair market value is an appropriate measure of value, therefore, when
(as is typically the case) there is a market for the property for which a
determinate value can be assigned. It is also appropriate when there is
no determinate pecuniary value of the right to use the property (its
value in use) 33 or when the right to use the property has a pecuniary
value less than fair market value. In such cases, fair market value puts
the owner in the pecuniary position the owner would have occupied but
for the taking. In the typical case, the owner can keep the cash
equivalent or use it to buy an equivalent lot on the market.
The same principles hold true even when the entire property is not
taken. There, the owner recovers the value of the part taken and the
loss of exchange value (diminution of fair market value) of the remainder.'
The owner may then sell the remainder at the diminished price
to obtain the monetary equivalent of the original property, which the
owner can keep or use to buy property similar to the original lot.
Hence, a market standard is normally pertinent to compensation
because there is almost always some market value, but there is often no
determinate value in use. Market value may therefore be presumed to
be the proper measure of compensation in the absence of competent
evidence that the value in use of the property exceeds market value.
C.

When Market Value is Inappropriate

It also follows that when there is no market for the property, when
there is no determinate market value, or when the determinate
pecuniary value of the right to use the property exceeds the market
value of the property, the owner is not justly and adequately compensated for the pecuniary loss by market value. Compensation is not just and
adequate unless the award equals the pecuniary loss in use value.
Likewise, when the property is taken only in part, if the resulting
pecuniary loss of use value exceeds the loss of exchange value, the
principle of compensation requires that the owner be awarded the lost

130. Wells v. Mayor of Savannah, 87 Ga. 397, 399, 13 S.E. 442, 442 (1891); see also
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, supra note 127, at 20.
131. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, supra note 127, at 20.

132. Id.
133. For example, it is difficult to imagine a way to quantify the value in use of a
residence apart from the value in exchange of selling it or renting it.
134. See, e.g., Wright v. MARTA, 248 Ga. 372, 373, 283 S.E.2d 466, 468 (1981).
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value of the use. In such cases, a mere market standard is inappropriate.
The foregoing points, flowing from constitutional language and general
principles, are well summarized as follows:
[W]hile market value is the general yardstick in a condemnation
proceeding.... there may be circumstances in which market value and
actual value [value in use] are not the same, and in such event the jury
may consider the actual value of the land or interest therein appropriated .... In determining just and adequate compensation, under the
constitutional provision, market value and actual value will ordinarily
be synonymous. If they are not, that value which will give "just and
adequate compensation" is the one to be sought by the jury in
rendering its verdict."
In Bowers the court recognized that "frequently the value of the business
greatly exceeds that of the premises where it is conducted." 3 ' The
court thereby recognized that just and adequate compensation may
require payment of lost business damages.' 37
D.

Uniqueness and Mitigation of Damages

This does not mean that there is a compensable business loss every
time a condemnor takes all or part of business property. Not only must
the value in use of the business property exceed its market value, but
the condemnee is also bound by the principle of mitigation of damages.
Essentially, if the owner could obtain other property on which to relocate
the business, it should do so. 8' Mitigation of damages manifests itself
in the so-called uniqueness concept discussed extensively above. 3 9
The basic idea behind the "locality test"140 is obviously that, if the
business can continue by recovering market value for the lot and buying
a similar piece of property that has similar use value, mitigation of
damages requires that it do so and limits damages accordingly.
However, if the owner cannot mitigate the business losses by this means,
then the total pecuniary loss will not be compensated by market value.
In earlier times, when vacant land in cities was still uniformly available,
property could almost never be unique under this rule. But as vacant

135. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, Inc., 91 Ga. App. at 885-86, 87 S.E.2d at 676

(citations omitted).
136. 221 Ga. at 739, 146 S.E.2d at 891.
137. Id.
138. Brown v. Department of Transp., 194 Ga. App. 530, 531, 391 S.E.2d 32, 33 (1990).
139. See supra Part II.B.
140. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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land becomes filled with more useful and specially designed improvements, more and more lots have and will become unique.
The "value to the owner test""' is nothing more than an application
of the following basic calculus: this owner's value in use exceeds the
value of the lot in exchange to others.
The "no market value test""" concerns the unusual case in which
market value is intrinsically inapplicable and some determinate value
must be found for the property's value in use.
The above rules for determining when business damage claims are
appropriate are imperfect. They are overinclusive in that one of these
rules may apply, but the owner still may be able to mitigate its damages
through reasonable efforts. In such a case, there is a risk that the owner
could recover damages for total business loss at one location and recover
some or all of the business at another location. The rules are also
underinclusive in that a case may not fall within one of them, and yet
the owner could not otherwise mitigate damages by relocating the
business elsewhere. In such a case, limiting the owner to market value
may easily fail to award true compensation. An approach that focuses
exclusively on mitigation of damages avoids both extremes.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the supreme court should harmonize the
law and thereby reconcile it with the text of the constitution. In
particular, the following outline is suggested for resolving questions of
compensation under the constitution's eminent domain clause:
1. The overarching purpose of the inquiry in an eminent domain case
is to determine what is just and adequate compensation for each
property owner's interest in the property taken or damaged. All other
rules must yield to this principle.
2. In the absence of any other evidence, market value is presumed to
be the appropriate standard for valuing each property interest.
3. Any party may show otherwise relevant evidence of business profits
and losses to show that a property interest had a business value greater
than market value, whether the owner of the interest is a landlord or
tenant, whether the taking is total or partial, and whether the taking is
temporary or permanent.
4. Any party may show the availability of property with similar utility
in the market to show that the business could relocate to the other
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See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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property or to assert a claim for the expenses incurred and losses caused
by such relocation.
5. If a business valuation is not foreclosed by the mitigation of
damages rule or any other rule, the choice between market value and
business value should be the measure that will yield just and adequate
compensation.

